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Tanja	A.	Börzel	and	Ulrich	Sedelmeier	
 
Abstract	 Although	enlargement	increases	the	preference	diversity	in	the	EU,	this	paper	shows	
that	enlargement	has	not	led	to	a	deterioration	of	compliance	with	EU	law.	In	three	of	the	EU’s	four	
enlargement	rounds,	the	new	member	states	comply	better	with	EU	law	than	the	old	member	states.	
The	 southern	 enlargement	 in	 the	 1980s	 is	 the	 only	 one	 that	 led	 to	 a	 substantial	 increase	 in	 non-
compliance.	 Particularly	 surprising	 for	 the	main	 compliance	 theories,	which	 focus	 on	 state	 power,	
adjustment	 costs,	 administrative	 capacities,	 or	 legitimacy,	 is	 the	 good	 performance	 of	 the	 post-
communist	Central	and	Eastern	European	new	member	states	after	the	eastern	enlargement	in	the	
2000s.	Our	analysis	suggests	that	the	use	of	pre-accession	conditionality	in	the	eastern	enlargement	
explains	why	 these	new	members	perform	so	well	 -	 unlike	 their	 Southern	 counterparts	who	 faced	
equally	unfavourable	country-level	conditions	for	compliance.	
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Introduction	
Research	on	European	integration	tends	to	assume	that	a	larger	membership	does	not	only	weaken	
the	decision-making	 capacity	 of	 the	 European	Union	 (EU)	 (Toshkov	 2017)	 but	 also	 its	 legal	 system	
through	growing	non-compliance.	Our	paper	presents	the	first	longitudinal	analysis	of	compliance	by	
the	EU’s	new	member	states	since	the	first	enlargement	in	1973.	It	shows	that	–	enlargement	has	not	
led	to	a	deterioration	of	compliance	with	EU	law.	In	three	of	the	EU’s	four	enlargement	rounds,	the	
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new	members	comply	better	with	EU	law	than	the	old	member	states.	Only	the	southern	enlargement	
round	in	the	first	half	of	the	1980s	led	to	a	substantial	increase	in	non-compliance.		
None	of	the	main	theories	of	compliance	with	international	law	is	able	to	explain	fully	the	compliance	
patterns	across	 the	 four	enlargement	 rounds.	Particularly	 surprising	 is	 the	good	 compliance	of	 the	
post-communist	new	member	states	in	the	eastern	enlargement	in	the	mid-2000s.	This	paper	suggests	
that	 their	 good	 compliance	 is	 not	 simply	 the	 result	 of	 a	 temporary	 ‘newness	 effect’,	 nor	 of	more	
generous	 transition	 periods	 and	 (temporary)	 exemptions,	 nor	 of	 a	 decoupling	 of	 good	 formal	
transposition	of	EU	directives	 into	national	 law	from	their	practical	 implementation	on	the	ground.	
Instead,	 we	 argue	 that	 the	 use	 of	 pre-accession	 conditionality	 in	 the	 eastern	 enlargement	 round	
explains	why	these	new	members	perform	so	well.	
In	order	to	establish	our	argument,	the	paper	proceeds	in	four	steps.	First,	we	set	out	the	contrasting	
expectations	of	three	main	approaches	to	compliance,	which	focus	on	state	power	and	adjustment	
costs,	administrative	capacities,	and	on	the	perceived	legitimacy	of	the	EU,	for	the	four	enlargement	
rounds.	Second,	we	present	the	empirical	evidence	of	how	these	enlargement	rounds	have	affected	
non-compliance.	None	of	the	compliance	theories	can	fully	account	for	the	differential	patterns	we	
find,	particularly	with	regard	to	the	eastern	enlargement.	The	third	section	of	the	paper	demonstrates	
that	alternative	ad	hoc	explanations	for	the	good	performance	of	the	eastern	enlargement	round	also	
do	not	hold.	The	fourth	section	conducts	a	systematic	regression	analysis	of	compliance	of	all	acceding	
states	during	their	respective	first	ten	years	of	membership.	We	show	that	the	use	of	pre-accession	
conditionality	in	the	eastern	enlargement	explains	why	these	new	members	perform	better	than	their	
Southern	 counterparts	 despite	 equally	 unfavourable	 country-level	 characteristics,	 such	 as	 low	
administrative	 capacities	 and	 high	 adjustment	 costs.	 Our	 findings	 have	 key	 implications	 for	 future	
enlargement(s):	since	in	most	prospective	new	member	states	domestic	conditions	for	compliance	are	
unfavourable,	pre-accession	conditionality	plays	an	important	role	to	ensure	that	compliance	does	not	
suffer	after	accession.		
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Enforcement,	Management	and	Legitimacy:	compliance	theories	and	the	impact	of	enlargement		
The	literature	features	three	prominent	approaches	to	explain	non-compliance	with	international	law	
(cf.	Tallberg	2002;	Checkel	2001;	Börzel	et	al.	2010).	Enforcement	approaches	focus	on	governments’	
deliberate	 decisions	 not	 to	 comply	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 the	 costs	 of	 compliance.	 This	 is	 precisely	 the	
mechanism	underpinning	the	hypothesis	that	greater	preference	diversity	through	enlargement	leads	
to	an	increase	in	non-compliance.	A	key	source	of	preference	diversity	and	related	costs	of	compliance	
is	 wealth:	 richer	 states	 with	 more	 demanding	 regulatory	 standards	 generally	 face	 lower	 costs	 in	
adjusting	 to	 EU	 legislation	 than	 poorer	 states.	 Enforcement	 approaches	 also	 identify	 the	 size	 of	 a	
member	state	as	a	key	factor	that	determines	its	power	to	resist	compliance	(Börzel	et	al.	2010):	big	
member	states	whose	votes	are	more	important	in	EU	decision-making	can	afford	to	care	less	about	
the	reputational	damage	associated	with	non-compliance.		
Most	of	the	countries	that	have	joined	the	EU	are	small,	although	each	enlargement	round,	with	the	
exception	of	the	European	Free	Trade	Association	(EFTA)	enlargement	in	1995,	also	included	at	least	
one	larger	member	state	(figure	1	depicts	the	differences	in	voting	power	of	member	states	across	the	
various	 enlargement	 rounds).	 Power-based	 enforcement	 approaches	 would	 thus	 expect	 non-
compliance	 to	be	particularly	problematic	 in	 the	Northern	enlargement	of	 1973	 (that	 included	 the	
United	Kingdom	(UK))	and	the	Southern	enlargement	(with	Spain).	Conversely,	compliance	would	be	
less	problematic	in	the	Eastern	enlargement	(although	it	included	Poland,	it	did	so	alongside	11	smaller	
states)	 and	 especially	 for	 the	 EFTA	 enlargement	 (that	 only	 included	 small	 states).	With	 regard	 to	
differences	in	compliance	costs,	a	focus	on	wealth,	measured	in	terms	of	Gross	domestic	product	(GDP)	
per	capita	(see	figure	2)	would	lead	us	to	expect	fewer	problems	especially	with	regard	to	the	EFTA	
enlargement,	but	also	the	Northern	enlargement,	and	more	problems	with	the	southern	and	eastern	
enlargements.	
[Figure	1	and	Figure	2	about	here]	
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Management	approaches	assume	that	non-compliance	is	a	question	of	lacking	capacities	rather	than	
political	 willingness.	 Countries	 that	 use	 their	 administrative	 capacities	 efficiently	 in	 the	
implementation	of	 EU	 law	are	better	 compliers	 than	 those	with	weak	 and	 corrupt	 administrations	
(Börzel	et	al.	2010;	Hille	and	Knill	2006).1	Administrative	capacities	clearly	separate	the	Northern	and	
EFTA	enlargement	rounds,	on	the	one	hand,	and	the	Southern	and	Eastern	enlargement	rounds,	on	
the	 other	 (see	 figure	 3).	 The	 UK	 and	 Denmark	 (and	 to	 a	 lesser	 extent	 Ireland)	 in	 the	 Northern	
enlargement,	 as	 well	 as	 Austria,	 Finland,	 and	 Sweden	 in	 the	 EFTA	 enlargement	 have	 high	
administrative	capacities.	By	contrast,	 the	Southern,	Central	and	Eastern	European	countries	which	
joined	in	the	1980s	and	2000s,	respectively,	share	some	features	of	their	political	and	administrative	
systems	that	undermine	their	capacity	to	effectively	implement	and	comply	with	EU	law:	inefficient	
administrations	ridden	by	patronage	and	corruption,	 legacies	of	authoritarianism,	weakly	organized	
societal	 interests,	 and	 low	 levels	 of	 socio-economic	 development	 (Sedelmeier	 2008;	 Börzel	 2009;	
Crawford	and	Lijphart	1997;	Cirtautas	and	Schimmelfennig	2010).	From	a	management	perspective,	
the	Southern	and	Eastern	enlargement	rounds	should,	hence,	have	resulted	in	a	significant	increase	of	
non-compliance	whereas	the	Northern	and	EFTA	enlargement	rounds	should	have	had	little	effect	on	
non-compliance.	
For	 legitimacy	 approaches,	 finally,	 a	 key	 determinant	 of	 states’	 decisions	 about	 compliance	 is	 the	
extent	 to	which	 states	 identify	with	 the	 EU	 and	 consider	 the	 EU	 in	 general	 (and	 specific	 EU	 rules)	
legitimate.	At	 its	most	general,	the	perceived	legitimacy	of	EU	law	can	be	seen	as	a	function	of	the	
duration	of	membership.	Joining	the	EU	transforms	candidate	states	into	member	states	(Sandholtz	
1996)	that	comply	with	EU	law	as	a	habit	of	obedience	once	they	have	internalized	EU	law.	Compliance	
with	EU	law	is	then	taken	for	granted	and	constitutes	a	value	in	itself.	Socialization	of	both	elites	and	
publics	into	EU	law	takes	time,	so	duration	of	membership	matters.	Widening	of	European	integration	
by	 accepting	 new	 members	 could,	 hence,	 undermine	 compliance.	 However,	 for	 two	 of	 the	
enlargement	 rounds,	 institutional	 frameworks	 for	 the	 adoption	 of	 EU	 legislation	 prior	 to	 full	
membership	could	have	alleviated	this	effect.	The	partial	membership	of	Austria,	Finland,	and	Sweden	
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in	the	Single	Market	through	the	European	Economic	Area,	and	the	pre-accession	legislative	alignment	
process	of	the	Central	and	Eastern	European	countries	might	have	fostered	the	internalization	of	EU	
law	into	the	domestic	legal	systems	before	they	joined.	Nevertheless,	socialization,	especially	beyond	
government	elites,	requires	time.	From	this	perspective,	we	should	then	generally	expect	compliance	
problems	at	the	beginning	of	membership	and	improvement	over	time.		
Another	 strand	 of	 legitimacy	 approaches	 does	 not	 focus	 on	 the	 length	 of	 membership,	 but	 on	
prevailing	 attitudes	 within	 a	 state	 towards	 European	 integration	 as	 a	 key	 determining	 factor	 for	
compliance.	 Governments	 (and	 publics)	 that	 have	 a	 strong	 normative	 attachment	 to	 European	
integration	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 consider	 compliance	 with	 EU	 law	 as	 appropriate	 behaviour.	 In	 this	
respect,	the	Northern	and	the	EFTA	enlargement	rounds	again	broadly	contrast	with	the	Southern	and	
Eastern	 enlargements	 (see	 figure	 4).	 The	 countries	 that	 joined	 in	 1973	 and	 1995	 are	 generally	
considered	Eurosceptic,	showing	a	low	net	support	for	EU	membership	(with	the	exception	of	Ireland,	
and	to	some	extent	Finland);	they	had	initially	chosen	to	remain	outside	the	integration	project	and	
eventually	 joined	 as	 a	 result	 of	 economic	 considerations	 despite	 continued	 reservations	 against	
political	integration.	By	contrast,	for	the	Southern	and	Eastern	European	countries	that	joined	the	EU	
after	 their	 successful	 transition	 to	 democracy,	 EU	 membership	 was	 not	 only	 considered	 to	 be	
materially	beneficial,	but	part	of	a	return	to	the	European	community	of	states	with	which	they	share	
constitutive	 norms.	 From	 this	 perspective,	 these	 two	 enlargement	 rounds	 should	 have	 led	 to	 less	
compliance	problems	than	the	northern	and	EFTA	enlargements.	
	
Non-compliance	and	Enlargement:	Empirical	Evidence	
To	 assess	 compliance	 with	 EU	 law,	 we	 use	 data	 on	 infringement	 proceedings	 that	 the	 European	
Commission	has	been	opening	against	member	states	for	violating	EU	law.	The	European	Commission	
records	 aggregate	 data	 of	 the	 infringement	 proceedings	 in	 its	 Annual	 Reports	 on	Monitoring	 the	
Application	of	Community	Law.	The	Berlin	infringement	database	(Börzel	and	Knoll	2012)	contains	the	
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raw	data,	obtained	from	the	Commission,	of	the	over	12.000	individual	infringement	cases	in	which	
the	Commission	issued	a	Reasoned	Opinion	to	member	states	between	1978	and	2012.	We	update	
these	data	for	the	years	2011-2015	with	the	information	contained	in	the	regular	updates	about	the	
Commission’s	infringement	decisions	published	online	by	the	Commission’s	Secretariat	General.	The	
number	of	Reasoned	Opinions	–	the	second	formal	stage	of	the	infringement	procedure	–	is	used	as	a	
measure	for	non-compliance.	Reasoned	Opinions	concern	the	more	serious	cases	of	non-compliance	
as	they	refer	to	conflicts	which	could	not	be	solved	through	informal	negotiations	at	earlier	stages.	At	
the	same	time,	they	are	not	limited	to	the	most	politicised	cases	that	the	Commission	eventually	refers	
to	the	Court	of	Justice	of	the	EU.	
In	 general,	 we	 should	 be	 careful	 when	 using	 infringement	 data	 as	 an	 indicator	 of	 compliance	 (cf.	
Falkner	 et	 al.	 2005).	 First,	 the	 infringement	 data	 only	 includes	 non-compliance	 cases	 that	 the	
Commission	is	aware	of,	and	detection	is	particularly	difficult	for	cases	of	incorrect	application	of	EU	
law.	However,	the	infringement	data	do	not	only	include	(late,	incomplete,	or	incorrect)	transposition	
of	directives,	but	also	incorrect	application	of	directives,	regulation,	and	treaty	articles.	Still,	especially	
to	detect	incorrect	application,	the	Commission	depends	strongly	on	complaints	sent	by	EU	citizens,	
businesses,	 and	 civil	 society	 and	 private	 interest	 organizations.	 To	 examine	whether	 cross-country	
differences	in	the	role	of	such	societal	groups	could	bias	the	data,	we	explicitly	consider	the	possibility	
of	 a	 decoupling	 of	 formal	 and	 practical	 compliance.	 Second,	 infringement	 cases	 record	 the	
Commission’s	view	of	what	constitutes	a	violation	of	EU	 law	and	 the	Commission	has	discretion	 in	
pursuing	suspected	non-compliance.	Crucially,	however,	there	is	no	evidence	that	infringement	data	
is	 systematically	 biased	 towards	 certain	 member	 states	 (cf.	 Börzel	 et	 al.	 2010).	 Certain	 caveats	
notwithstanding,	infringement	cases	are	thus	not	only	the	most	systematic	and	comparable	source	of	
information	 on	 non-compliance	 available,	 but	 also	 adequate-	 especially	 for	 cross-national	
comparisons.	
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For	 comparisons	 over	 different	 time	 periods,	 additional	 considerations	 are	 necessary.	 Simple	
comparisons	 of	 the	 absolute	 number	 of	 Reasoned	 Opinions	 across	 different	 time	 periods	 are	
misleading.	The	Commission’s	practice	and	procedures	to	pursue,	and	informally	solve,	infringement	
cases	have	changed	over	time,	and	crucially,	the	numbers	of	legal	acts	that	can	be	potentially	infringed	
has	increased	more	than	tenfold	between	2010	and	1978.	To	control	for	these	changes	over	time,	we	
compare	the	non-compliance	of	old	and	new	member	states	 for	each	enlargement	round.	Figure	5	
(below)	depicts	 the	annual	average	number	of	Reasoned	Opinions	by	 the	new	member	states	as	a	
share	of	the	median	number	of	infringements	of	the	(then)	old	members	over	a	ten-year	period	after	
their	 accession,	 starting	 from	 the	 second	 year	 of	 membership	 (to	 allow	 for	 the	 time	 it	 takes	 for	
infringement	procedures	to	reach	the	stage	of	Reasoned	Opinion).	Recording	the	infringements	of	new	
members	relative	to	the	annual	median	of	the	old	members	not	only	controls	for	changes	in	violative	
opportunities	(the	volume	of	legislation	in	force)	but	also	changes	in	the	EU’s	compliance	system	and	
the	Commission's	practice,	since	they	affect	old	and	new	members	equally	at	a	given	point	in	time.2		
Figure	5	about	here	
Figure	 5	 reveals	 that	 the	 southern	 enlargement	 is	 the	 only	 enlargement	 round	 that	 substantially	
increased	non-compliance	in	the	EU.	Greece,	Spain	and	Portugal	display	a	considerably	higher	number	
of	average	infringements	than	the	(then)	old	member	states.	By	the	sixth	year	of	membership,	the	new	
members	had	exceeded	 the	 average	 infringements	of	 the	old	member	 states,	more	 than	doubling	
them.	Since	then	average	infringements	have	dropped,	but	remain	clearly	above	the	level	of	the	old	
members.	Greece	and	Portugal	quickly	joined	Italy	and	France	in	the	group	of	compliance	laggards,	
while	Spain	belongs	to	the	middle	group.	The	southern	enlargement,	hence,	accounts	for	the	peak	in	
the	overall	infringements	we	observe	in	the	early	1990s	(Börzel	2001).		
In	the	other	three	enlargement	rounds,	the	newcomers	performed	consistently	better	than	the	old	
member	states.	These	enlargement	rounds	are	also	more	homogenous	with	regard	to	the	variation	in	
the	non-compliance	rates	of	individual	new	members	and	they	also	remain	fairly	stable	within	a	few	
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years	of	accession.	The	non-compliance	rates	in	these	enlargement	rounds	are	close,	with	the	Northern	
enlargement	round	(data	are	only	available	from	1978)	performing	slightly	better	than	the	EFTA	and	
Eastern	 enlargements.	 With	 Denmark,	 the	 Northern	 enlargement	 also	 brought	 one	 of	 the	 EU’s	
consistent	 compliance	 leaders	 into	 the	 EU.	 In	 the	 EFTA	 enlargement,	 Finland	 and	 Sweden	 quickly	
joined	the	group	of	leading	performers.		
Finally,	the	Eastern	enlargement	has	not	increased	non-compliance	either.	The	12	new	member	states	
that	 joined	in	2004	and	2007	have	generally	scored	better	than	the	average	of	the	EU15.	 Indeed,	a	
number	of	studies	suggest	that	there	is	no	particular	compliance	problem	in	the	East	(Sedelmeier	2006;	
Sedelmeier	 2008;	 Sedelmeier	 2012;	 Toshkov	 2008;	Dimitrova	 and	 Toshkov	 2007;	 Steunenberg	 and	
Toshkov	2009;	Zhelyazkova	et	al.	2014;	Zhelyazkova	et	al.	2017).	Moreover,	they	do	not	only	transpose	
directives	as	fast,	or	even	faster,	than	the	old	member	states	but	also	tend	to	settle	their	infringement	
procedures	more	 swiftly	 (Dimitrova	 and	 Toshkov	 2007;	 Sedelmeier	 2008;	 Toshkov	 2007a;	 Toshkov	
2008;	Steunenberg	and	Toshkov	2009).		
While	most	of	the	new	member	states	outperform	nearly	all	the	old	member	states	(Sedelmeier	2008,	
Sedelmeier	2012),	there	is	variation	(see	figure	6).	Poland	and	the	Czech	Republic	have	been	lagging	
behind	the	other	new	member	states.	While	the	Czech	Republic	has	made	marked	progress	since	2010,	
Poland,	in	contrast,	has	become	a	compliance	laggard	in	the	enlarged	EU.	Bulgaria	and	Romania	range	
in	 the	 middle	 of	 the	 eastern	 enlargement	 group	 alongside	 Estonia,	 Slovenia,	 Hungary,	 Malta	 and	
Cyprus.	Lithuania,	Latvia	and	Slovakia	are	consistently	the	best	performers	not	only	among	these	new	
members,	but	in	the	enlarged	EU	as	a	whole.	
Qualitative	and	quantitative	case	studies	of	specific	policy	areas	also	show	that	similarly	 to	 the	old	
member	 states,	 the	 eastern	members	 differ	 significantly	when	 it	 comes	 to	 complying	with	 EU	 law	
(Toshkov	 2007b;	 Toshkov	 2008;	 Sedelmeier	 2009;	 Schwellnus	 2009;	 Zhelyazkova	 et	 al.	 2017).	 The	
variation	across	the	eastern	new	members	is	not	too	surprising,	but	it	should	also	not	be	overstated,	
not	least	since	the	performance	of	many	newcomers	also	fluctuates	–	albeit	generally	at	a	very	good	
9	
	
level	 –	over	 the	 first	 ten	 years	of	membership.	While	 variation	across	 the	new	members	does	not	
necessarily	deny	the	effect	of	common	socialist	legacies	on	compliance	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe,	
“these	legacies	do	not	carry	equal	weight	across	the	region”	(Cirtautas	and	Schimmelfennig	2010:	428;	
cf.	Seleny	2007).		
In	sum,	despite	continuous	widening,	non-compliance	has	decreased	rather	than	increased	in	the	EU.	
None	of	 the	main	 approaches	 to	 compliance	 can	 fully	 explain	 the	 non-compliance	 patterns	 across	
enlargement	 groups.	 For	 enforcement	 approaches,	 the	 generally	 positive	 performance	 of	 new	
members	is	unexpected,	particularly	in	the	case	of	the	Northern	enlargement.	Due	to	its	size,	the	UK	
should	have	caused	substantial	compliance	problems,	rather	than	demonstrating	some	of	the	lowest	
non-compliance	rates.	Differences	in	compliance	costs	resulting	from	wealth	differentials	could	explain	
the	compliance	problems	resulting	from	the	Southern	enlargement,	but	they	fail	to	account	for	why	
the	 even	 less	 wealthy	 post-communist	 new	 members	 performed	 so	 well.	 By	 the	 same	 token,	
management	 approaches	 capture	well	 the	 poor	 performance	 of	 the	 southern	 enlargement	 round,	
which	is	largely	due	to	these	countries’	weak	administrative	capacities.	However,	similar	administrative	
deficiencies	 have	 not	 led	 to	 similar	 compliance	 problems	 in	 the	 eastern	 enlargement.	 Legitimacy	
approaches,	finally,	are	contradicted	by	the	positive	performance	of	the	broadly	Eurosceptic	states	in	
the	Northern	and	EFTA	enlargements	as	well	as	the	negative	record	 in	the	Europhile	southern	new	
members.	Duration	of	membership	does	not	 seem	to	make	a	difference	either	given	 this	variation	
among	newcomers	and	the	consistently	bad	performance	of	three	of	the	founding	members.	
In	 view	 of	 the	 difficulties	 of	 the	 main	 compliance	 theories	 to	 account	 for	 the	 variation	 across	
enlargement	rounds,	we	first	discuss	and	reject	alternative	explanations	for	the	unexpectedly	good	
compliance	of	the	new	members.	In	the	subsequent	section	we	conduct	a	systematic	analysis	of	the	
compliance	of	all	new	member	states	across	the	various	enlargement	rounds	during	their	first	ten	years	
after	accession	in	order	to	get	a	better	understanding	of	what	is	specific	to	the	eastern	enlargement	
round	that	might	bolster	compliance.	
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Newness,	 differentiated	 integration	 and	 decoupling:	 alternative	 explanations	 for	 the	 good	
compliance	of	new	members	
We	 identify	 three	 sets	of	alternative	explanations	 for	 the	good	compliance	of	new	members	more	
generally,	as	well	as	 for	 the	particularly	puzzling	performance	of	 the	eastern	new	members.	These	
explanations	are	rather	ad	hoc,	since	they	are	not	systematically	derived	from	any	specific	compliance	
theory.	The	first	set	focuses	on	the	possible	temporary	nature	of	new	members’	good	compliance.	The	
second	 alternative	 explanation	 identifies	 the	 trade-off	 between	 compliance	 and	 differentiated	
integration	as	crucial;	and	the	third	a	decoupling	between	good	formal	compliance	and	undetected	
deficient	behavioural	compliance	in	the	practical	application	of	EU	rules	on	the	ground.	
Are	early	compliance	patterns	misleading?	Periods	of	grace	and	honeymoon	
Positive	early	compliance	patterns	might	not	be	indicative	of	longer	terms	trends	for	two	main	reasons.	
First,	it	has	been	suggested	that	the	Commission	might	grant	new	members	a	‘period	of	grace’	during	
which	it	does	not	pursue	infringement	cases	as	quickly	as	in	the	other	member	states	in	order	to	ease	
them	 into	 the	 EU’s	 compliance	 system.	 In	 particular	 the	 southern	 new	members	 are	 said	 to	 have	
initially	 benefitted	 from	 a	 more	 lenient	 treatment	 (Börzel	 2000),	 which	 would	 explain	 why	 their	
compliance	became	inferior	to	that	of	the	old	member	states	only	by	the	fourth	year	after	accession.	
A	second	reason	for	the	initial	good	compliance	patterns	is	that	newcomers	might	feel	under	particular	
reputational	 pressures	 to	 establish	 a	 track	 record	 of	 good	 performance.	 They	 would	 then	 make	
extraordinary	efforts	during	their	first	years	of	membership,	but	this	effect	should	wear	off	once	they	
do	not	feel	any	longer	under	particular	observation.	If	such	periods	of	grace	and	‘honeymoon	periods’	
indeed	 exist,	 they	might	 cast	 doubts	 on	 whether	 the	 good	 record	 of	 new	member	 states	 can	 be	
maintained	after	more	than	a	decade	after	their	accession.		
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In	order	to	test	the	validity	of	this	alternative	explanation,	we	use	descriptive	statistics	to	compare	
infringements	of	new	members	relative	to	old	members	over	time.	Figure	7	shows	the	average	number	
of	Reasoned	Opinions	for	the	new	members	of	each	enlargement	round	relative	to	the	median	number	
for	the	old	member	states	for	each	year	after	accession.	While	we	do	not	yet	have	much	data	on	the	
eastern	new	members’	compliance	after	a	decade	of	membership	and	the	most	recent	year	seems	to	
indicate	some	deterioration	in	compliance,3	descriptive	statistics	of	the	longer-term	records	of	the	new	
members	in	earlier	enlargement	rounds	suggest	that	early	compliance	patterns	are	indeed	indicative	
of	 longer-term	 trends.	 Compliance	 during	 the	 very	 first	 few	 years	 of	 membership	 seems	 to	 have	
benefitted	from	a	period	of	grace	or	a	honeymoon	 in	the	case	of	the	southern,	and	even	the	EFTA	
enlargement.	But	 the	compliance	patterns	during	 the	 first	 ten	years	 remain	otherwise	 fairly	 stable	
afterwards.	While	there	is	some	fluctuation	over	time	for	the	different	enlargement	rounds,	there	is	
certainly	no	general	deterioration	of	compliance.	
Figure	7	about	here	
Easing	compliance	through	differentiated	integration?	
Differentiated	integration	may	explain	why	non-compliance	has	not	increased	more	after	the	various	
enlargement	 rounds.	 Exemptions	 from	 the	 obligations	 of	 EU	 law	 for	 newcomers	 can	 ease	 their	
compliance	problems.	While	they	are	only	temporary,	especially	in	the	case	of	eastern	enlargement,	
some	of	these	exemptions	still	applied	12	years	after	accession.	
The	use	of	differentiated	 integration	 in	the	EU’s	primary	and	secondary	 law	has	 increased	over	the	
years,	whereby	opt-outs	from	EU	treaty	changes	only	started	to	take	off	after	the	Maastricht	Treaty	
(Schimmelfennig	 and	 Winzen	 2017).	 The	 growing	 opportunity	 for	 member	 states	 to	 avoid	 legal	
obligations	that	would	be	costly,	resource	intensive	or	politically	controversial,	could	have	helped	to	
bring	down	non-compliance.	Yet,	the	member	state	have	never	made	use	of	more	than	12	per	cent	of	
the	opt-out	opportunities	granted	by	the	EU	treaties	in	any	given	year	(Schimmelfennig	and	Winzen	
2014,	2017).	Moreover,	the	relative	importance	of	differentiated	integration	for	the	EU’s	secondary	
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law	has	declined.	Rules	that	exempt	member	states	from	their	obligations	to	comply	with	EU	legal	acts	
(almost	exclusively	directives)	increased	over	the	years	and	peaked	in	the	early	2000s.	Their	share	in	
the	 legislation	 in	 force,	however,	has	been	decreasing	over	 time.	There	are	 four	peaks	 in	 the	early	
1970s,	early	1990s,	the	late	1990s,	and	the	mid-2000s,	which	are	the	result	of	temporary	exemptions	
granted	to	new	member	states	that	joined	in	these	periods	–	the	enlargement	rounds	of	1973,	1995,	
2004/2007,	as	well	as	German	unification	in	1990,	but	not	in	the	case	of	the	southern	enlargement	in	
the	1980s	 (Schimmelfennig	and	Winzen	2017).	Could	 these	differences	 in	 the	use	of	differentiated	
integration	explain	why	only	the	Southern	enlargement	led	to	an	increase	in	non-compliance?	
Yet	most	of	these	opt-outs	are	temporary	and	are	phased	out	10-15	years	after	accession.	Only	the	
UK,	Denmark,	and	Ireland	have	continued	to	obtain	opt-outs.	For	the	eastern	new	members,	it	may	be	
still	 too	early	 to	 tell	 but	 the	number	of	 exemptions	 granted	 to	 them	 is	 only	 slightly	 above	 the	old	
member	 states	 (except	 the	UK,	 Denmark,	 and	 Ireland).	 Exemptions	 after	 the	 eastern	 enlargement	
resulted	in	a	considerably	smaller	increase	in	the	share	of	differentiated	rules	than	in	1973	and	1995.	
They	also	seemed	to	have	diminished	rather	quickly,	partly	because	many	entailed	discrimination	that	
old	member	states	imposed	on	the	new	members	in	the	accession	negotiations	to	mitigate	the	costs	
of	enlargement,	related	e.g.	to	the	opening	up	of	labour	markets,	the	redistribution	of	EU	funds,	or	the	
abolishing	of	border	controls	(Schimmelfennig	and	Winzen	2014,	2017).	Of	course	such	discriminatory	
differentiation	 would	 also	 not	 have	 a	 positive	 impact	 on	 compliance	 as	 opposed	 to	 temporary	
exemptions	from	obligations	with	regard	to	applying	EU	law.	
Decoupling	of	formal	and	behavioural	compliance	
Another	alternative	interpretation	of	the	good	compliance	of	the	new	members	has	been	particularly	
prominent	 in	 the	 case	 of	 eastern	 enlargement.	 Some	 case	 study	 research	 suggests	 that	 the	
infringement	 data	 does	 not	 capture	 serious	 violations	 of	 EU	 rules	 by	 the	 post-communist	 new	
members	in	their	practical	application	and	domestic	enforcement	(Falkner	et	al.	2008;	Batory	2012;	
Sedelmeier	2012;	Cirtautas	and	Schimmelfennig	2010;	Avdeyeva	2010;	Dimitrova	2010;	Trauner	2009;	
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Slapin	2015).	These	findings	may	point	to	a	decoupling	between	good	legal,	or	formal,	compliance	with	
regard	 to	 the	 transposition	 of	 EU	 legislation	 into	 national	 law,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 behavioural	
compliance	–	poor	practical	application	on	the	ground	–	on	the	other.	In	the	‘world	of	dead	letters’	
(Falkner	et	al.	2008),	EU	law	gets	swiftly	and	correctly	incorporated	into	national	law	but	is	not	put	into	
action.	 Such	 decoupling	 was	 already	 observed	 during	 the	 pre-accession	 phase	 of	 the	 eastern	
enlargement,	where	‘many	rules	have	been	only	formally	transposed	into	national	legislation	but	are	
not	fully	or	reliably	implemented’	(Schimmelfennig	and	Sedelmeier	2005:	226;	see	also	Hughes	et	al.	
2004;	Jacoby	2004;	Sissenich	2005;	Goetz	2005).		
Still,	 the	compliance	behaviour	of	the	new	member	states	cannot	be	simply	reduced	to	their	being	
transposition	leaders	and	application	laggards.	To	start	with,	infringement	proceedings	capture	both	
transposition	 and	 practical	 application.	 Also,	 the	 formal	 compliance	 records	 of	 the	 eastern	 new	
members	vary	too	much	for	decoupling	to	be	a	uniform	phenomenon.	More	substantively,	case	studies	
have	 so	 far	 failed	 to	 establish	 ‘dead	 letters’	 as	 a	 pervasive	 problem	 for	 all	 eastern	 new	members.	
Evidence	for	this	claim	relies	primarily	on	the	study	of	social	policy	directives	in	the	new	members	by	
Falkner	et	al.	(2008).	Yet,	the	social	policy	directives	examined,	and	particularly	gender	equality	at	the	
workplace,	are	generally	highly	prone	to	decoupling	in	old	and	new	members	alike.	To	some	extent,	
decoupling	might	thus	be	characteristic	of	issue-area	specific	difficulties	of	enforcement,	even	if	the	
relevant	 domestic	 enforcement	 bodies	 for	 workplace	 regulation	 are	 particularly	 weak	 in	 post-
communist	new	members	(Falkner	2010).	Little	evidence	of	a	general	‘eastern	world	of	dead	letters’	is	
found	 by	 other	 case	 studies.	 Toshkov’s	 detailed	 analyses	 of	 three	 policy	 areas	 –	 electronic	
communications,	consumer	protection	and	animal	welfare	–	suggest	that	shortcomings	with	practical	
implementation	and	application	of	EU	law	in	the	eastern	member	states	are	not	‘of	a	greater	scale	and	
different	nature	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	(CEE),	and	there	is	no	evidence	that	the	EU	rules	have	
been	mindlessly	copied	and	forgotten’	(Toshkov	2012,	108).	The	comparative	analysis	by	Zhelyazkova	
et	al.	(2017)	that	draws	on	in-depth	conformity	studies	of	practical	application	of	24	directives	across	
four	policy	areas	(Internal	Market,	environment,	social	policy,	and	Justice	and	Home	Affairs)	suggests	
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that	 decoupling	 is	 not	 more	 prominent	 in	 the	 new	members	 than	 in	 the	 old	 members,	 with	 the	
exception	of	social	policy.		
Of	course	such	counter-evidence	to	decoupling	can	also	be	criticised	for	relying	on	evaluation	reports	
(the	quality	of	which	can	also	be	contested,	 see	Mastenbroek	 et	al.	 2015)	and/or	on	a	 still	 limited	
number	of	policy	areas.	Clearly,	there	is	evidence	for	some	serious	compliance	problems	regarding	the	
practical	application	of	EU	law	in	the	post-communist	member	states	that	merit	further	investigation.	
While	it	might	therefore	be	too	early	to	dismiss	decoupling	completely	as	a	possible	explanation	for	
the	positive	infringement	record	of	the	eastern	new	members,	 it	appears	equally	questionable	that	
decoupling	is	a	pervasive	phenomenon	that	explains	away	their	positive	infringement	records.	
	
Analysis	 of	 compliance	 across	 new	 members	 and	 enlargement	 rounds:	 does	 pre-accession	
conditionality	matter?	
The	discussion	of	ad	hoc	alternative	explanations	shows	that	these	cannot	overcome	the	difficulties	
that	general	compliance	theories	have	 in	explaining	 the	unexpectedly	good	compliance	of	 the	new	
members,	 and	 the	post-communist	 new	members	 in	 particular,	 either.	 As	 a	 next	 step,	we	 seek	 to	
identify	whether	there	is	something	specific	to	the	eastern	enlargement	round	that	affects	compliance	
favourably.	We	focus	on	the	use	of	pre-accession	conditionality	as	a	key	element	that	differentiates	it	
from	earlier	rounds,	and	conditionality	seems	an	obvious	candidate	for	such	a	difference.	
For	this	analysis	we	disaggregate	the	enlargement	rounds,	and	focus	on	compliance	in	individual	new	
members.	Figure	8	shows	that	post-accession	compliance	varies	indeed	across	the	states	involved	in	
each	of	 the	 four	enlargement	 rounds.	 It	 is	possible	 that	 the	main	approaches	 to	compliance	might	
struggle	to	explain	compliance	records	for	entire	enlargement	rounds	that	we	focused	on	earlier,	but	
are	better	able	to	account	for	individual	new	members’	performance.		
Figure	8	about	here	
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We	 conduct	 different	 regression	 analyses	 of	 the	 four	 explanatory	 factors	 identified	 by	 the	 main	
compliance	 approaches,	 using	 the	 following	 indicators:	 Shapley	 Shubik	 Index	 (Shapley	 and	 Shubik	
1954;	Rodden	2002)	 for	power,	GDP/capita	for	adjustment	costs,	 the	bureaucratic	quality	 indicator	
developed	by	the	International	Country	Risk	Guide	for	administrative	capacities,	and	net	support	for	
EU	 membership	 (Eurobarometer)	 for	 legitimacy.	 In	 order	 to	 test	 whether	 the	 experience	 of	 pre-
accession	conditionality	can	explain	the	surprisingly	good	performance	of	the	eastern	new	members,	
we	include	a	dummy	variable	for	the	14	countries	that	were	subjected	to	conditionality.4	The	units	of	
analysis	are	country/years	for	each	new	member	during	their	first	ten	years	of	membership	(excluding	
the	first	year).	We	run	stepwise	regressions	to	compare	the	effect	of	collinear	variables,	testing,	as	a	
robustness	 check,	 three	models	 that	 operationalize	 the	dependent	 variable	 –	 non-compliance	 –	 in	
different	ways	to	control	for	time-varying	factors	that	affect	all	member	states	equally.	 In	addition,	
due	 to	 the	 high	 correlation	 between	 the	 indicators	 for	 wealth	 (GDP/capita)	 and	 administrative	
capacity,	we	run	each	model	first	excluding	administrative	capacity	and	then	excluding	wealth.		
The	 dependent	 variable	 in	 our	 first	 model	 is	 a	 new	member	 state’s	 annual	 number	 of	 Reasoned	
Opinions	as	a	share	of	the	median	for	the	old	member	states.	It	is	tested	by	Ordinary	Least	Squares	
(OLS)	with	robust	standard	errors.	In	this	model,	although	the	accession	conditionality	dummy	has	the	
expected	sign,	it	does	not	reach	significance.	In	fact,	barely	any	of	the	variables	do:	only	support	for	
EU	membership	(legitimacy)	does,	but	its	significance	is	low	and	–contrary	to	the	expectation	of	the	
legitimacy	hypothesis–	it	contributes	to	non-compliance.	
The	 other	 two	models	 provide	 support	 for	 the	 importance	 of	 pre-accession	 conditionality.	 In	 the	
second	model,	the	dependent	variable	is	the	annual	Reasoned	Opinions	of	the	new	member	states,	
expressed	as	the	annual	mean	of	all	member	states.	It	is	tested	by	OLS	with	robust	standard	errors.	In	
this	model,	the	dummy	for	accession	conditionality	reaches	significance	when	including	GDP/capita	
(although	not	very	 strongly	 so),	but	not	when	 including	 instead	bureaucratic	quality.	 In	 the	 former	
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case,	 GDP/capita	 also	 reaches	 significance,	 while	 in	 the	 latter	 case,	 both	 power	 and	 bureaucratic	
quality	do.	
The	 third	 model	 uses	 as	 its	 dependent	 variable	 the	 absolute	 number	 of	 infringements.	 It	 uses	 a	
negative	binomial	regression	with	robust	standard	errors.	The	dummy	for	pre-accession	conditionality	
is	significant	both	when	using	GDP/capita	(alongside	support	for	EU	membership	–	again	with	a	positive	
sign)	and	especially	when	using	bureaucratic	quality	(again	alongside	support	for	the	EU,	with	a	positive	
sign)	(Table	1).		
Table	1	about	here	
In	sum,	the	models	do	provide	preliminary	evidence	that	pre-accession	conditionality	has	a	positive	
impact	on	compliance	after	accession,	and	it	helps	explain	the	unexpectedly	good	performance	of	the	
new	member	states	despite	otherwise	largely	unfavourable	conditions	suggested	by	the	main	theories	
of	compliance.	While	the	analysis	suggests	that	conditionality	matters,	it	does	not	tell	us	what	it	is	that	
makes	conditionality	have	a	lasting	impact	on	compliance	after	accession.		
It	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper	to	provide	a	systematic	analysis	of	the	causal	mechanisms	through	
which	conditionality	affects	post-accession	compliance.	Existing	research	points	to	at	least	two	main	
ways	 in	 which	 the	 experience	 of	 conditionality	 could	 continue	 to	 affect	 compliance	 positively	
(Sedelmeier	2008:	820-22;	Sedelmeier	2016).	First,	 the	creation	of	highly	specialised	administrative	
and	legislative	capacities	during	the	pre-accession	period	to	transpose	large	amounts	of	EU	law	in	a	
short	 time	 may	 compensate	 for	 the	 relatively	 low	 general	 administrative	 capacities	 of	 the	 post-
communist	 countries.	 Second,	 pre-accession	 conditionality	 may	 also	 explain	 why	 government	
attitudes	towards	European	integration	mattered	in	the	new	members	after	the	eastern	enlargement	
although	they	do	not	have	much	of	either	a	positive	or	negative	effect	on	non-compliance	in	other	
member	 states.	The	experience	of	 regular	monitoring	and	assessments	of	progress	with	alignment	
during	the	pre-accession	period	has	created	for	decision-makers	 in	the	post-communist	countries	a	
clear	 link	 between	 compliance	 and	 being	 a	 deserving	 and	 acceptable	 member	 state.	 Europhile	
17	
	
governments	in	these	countries	are	therefore	more	inclined	to	endeavour	to	comply	well,	while	in	the	
old	member	states,	they	do	not	perceive	such	a	link.	
Are	 these	 largely	 positive	 findings	 about	 post-accession	 compliance,	 and	 the	 role	 of	 pre-accession	
conditionality	in	sustaining	it,	contradicted	by	evidence	of	democratic	backsliding	and	non-compliance	
with	the	liberal	democratic	principles	contained	in	Article	2	Treaty	on	European	Union	(TEU)	in	Hungary	
or	Poland?	The	contrast	between	these	two	issue	areas	relates	partly	to	differences	in	EU	leverage	(see	
also	Börzel	and	Schimmelfennig	2017).	Illiberal	governments	can	exploit	the	difficulties	of	mobilising	
the	 sanctions	 contained	 in	 Article	 7	 TEU,	 while	 otherwise	 complying	 with	 the	 acquis	 to	 continue	
enjoying	 the	benefits	of	EU	membership.	To	 the	extent	 that	pre-accession	conditionality	helped	 to	
build	capacities	for	post-accession	compliance	with	the	aquis,	compliance	will	continue	to	benefit	even	
if	 illiberal	 governments	 do	not	 consider	 it	 important	 for	 their	 country’s	 image	 as	 good	 community	
members.	
	
Conclusions	
This	 paper	 has	 shown	 that	 concerns	 that	 enlargement	 inevitably	 weakens	 the	 EU’s	 legal	 system	
through	increasing	non-compliance	by	the	new	member	states	are	unfounded.	The	net	effect	of	the	
EU’s	enlargement	rounds	has	instead	been	to	improve	compliance	in	the	enlarged	EU.	The	Southern	
enlargement	round	has	been	the	only	enlargement	in	which	the	new	members	have	performed	worse	
than	 the	 older	member	 states.	 The	 positive	 record	 of	 new	member	 states	 in	 general,	 and	 of	 the	
compliance	 patterns	 across	 the	 various	 enlargement	 rounds	 is	 difficult	 to	 explain	 for	 the	 main	
compliance	 theories	 that	 focus	 respectively	 on	 state	 power	 and	 adjustment	 costs,	 administrative	
capacity,	and	the	EU’s	perceived	legitimacy.	Particularly	puzzling	is	the	positive	record	of	the	eastern	
enlargement	round	that	contrasts	with	the	Southern	enlargement	where	the	conditions	were	broadly	
similar.	In	order	to	test	whether	the	experience	of	pre-accession	conditionality,	which	was	specific	to	
the	 eastern	 enlargement,	 can	 explain	 the	 positive	 record	 of	 these	 new	 members,	 we	 conducted	
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regression	 analyses	 of	 all	 new	 member	 states	 during	 their	 first	 ten	 years	 of	 membership.	 These	
preliminary	 results	 suggest	 that	 conditionality	 indeed	 has	 a	 positive	 impact	 on	 compliance	 after	
accession	is	achieved.	
Although	we	could	not	conduct	a	systematic	analysis	of	what	aspects	of	conditionality	have	such	a	
more	durable	impact,	our	findings	and	previous	research	suggest	some	lesson	for	future	enlargements.	
Concerns	about	compliance	after	accession	should	not	be	an	impediment	to	accepting	new	members.	
However,	 to	avoid	a	negative	 impact	on	compliance,	pre-accession	conditionality	has	an	 important	
role	to	play	and	needs	to	be	taken	very	seriously.	Rather	than	a	newcomer	bonus	or	differentiated	
integration,	the	creation	of	highly	specialised	administrative	and	legislative	capacities	during	the	pre-
accession	 period	 may	 compensate	 for	 the	 otherwise	 limited	 administrative	 capacities.	 The	 pre-
accession	experience	of	regular	monitoring	of	compliance	has	created	for	decision-makers	in	the	post-
communist	countries	a	clear	link	between	compliance	and	being	a	deserving	and	acceptable	member	
state,	which	makes	Europhile	governments	in	these	countries	more	inclined	to	endeavour	to	comply	
well.	The	importance	of	conditionality	for	post-accession	compliance	is	particularly	salient	with	regard	
to	current	candidate	countries	in	South-eastern	Europe,	where	key	conditions	for	compliance	–	such	
as	administrative	capacities	and	adjustment	costs	–	are	generally	unfavourable.		
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NOTES	
1	 Another	 factor	 that	 weakens	 the	 capacity	 of	 states	 to	 comply	 with	 their	 international	 commitments	 are	
domestic	 veto	 players	 (Putnam	1988;	Haverland	 2000;	 Tallberg	 2002).	 Yet,	 since	 the	 findings	 are	 at	 best	
inconclusive	(Mbaye	2001;	Toshkov	2010;	Börzel	et	al.	2010)	and	depend	heavily	on	measurement,	we	do	
not	include	it	in	our	analysis.	
2	We	calculate	the	(average)	annual	infringements	of	new	members	relative	to	the	median	(rather	than	the	mean)	
of	the	old	members,	since	there	are	extreme	outliers	among	the	old	member	states	(especially	Italy,	and	for	
later	rounds,	Greece).	The	median	appears	therefore	a	better	indicator	of	non-compliance	of	old	members	
than	the	mean.	
3	Absolute	numbers	of	infringement	cases	(which	need	to	be	used	with	caution,	since,	as	discussed	above,	they	
do	not	control	for	factors	that	change	over	time)	suggest	that	their	relative	deterioration	is	mainly	the	effect	
of	a	general	improvement	in	the	other	member	states.		
4	Of	course	the	regression	results	as	such	would	not	be	able	to	tell	us	whether	it	is	conditionality	or	something	
else	that	is	specific	to	this	round,	and	we	therefore	discuss	below	possible	ways	in	which	conditionality	could	
have	such	a	positive	effect	on	compliance.	
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Figure	1:	Average	Council	Voting	Power	(SSI)	of	new	members	across	enlargement	rounds	during	their	
first	ten	years	of	membership	
	
Note:	 Since	 the	 infringement	 data	 are	 only	 available	 from	 1978,	 we	 omit	 the	 first	 5	 years	 of	 the	 Northern	
enlargement	from	Figures	1-4.	
Voting	power	is	measured	by	the	Shapley	Shubik	Index	(SSI)	which	captures	the	proportion	of	times	when	a	
member	state	is	pivotal	(and	can,	thus,	turn	a	losing	into	a	winning	coalition)	under	qualified	majority	voting	in	
the	Council	of	Ministers	(Shapley	and	Shubik	1954;	Rodden	2002).	
	
Figure	2:	Average	GDP/capita	of	new	members	across	enlargement	rounds	during	their	first	10	years	
of	membership	
	
Note:	Calculated	from	The	World	Bank,	http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD		
	
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Northern	(1973) Southern	(1981+86) EFTA	(1995) Eastern	(2004+07)
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
40000
45000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Northern	(1973) Southern	(1981+86) EFTA	(1995) Eastern	(2004+07)
27	
	
Figure	3:	Bureaucratic	quality	(ICRG)	of	new	members	across	enlargement	rounds	during	the	first	10	
years	of	membership	
	
We	use	the	bureaucratic	quality	indicator	developed	by	the	International	Country	Risk	Guide	(ICRG).	It	captures	
the	ability	and	expertise	of	states	to	govern	without	drastic	changes	 in	policy	or	 interruptions	 in	government	
services,	the	extent	to	which	their	bureaucracy	 is	autonomous	from	political	pressure	and	has	an	established	
mechanism	for	recruitment	and	training,	and	also	evaluates	policy	formulation	and	day-to-day	administrative	
functions.	
	
Figure	4:	Net	support	for	EU	membership	(Eurobarometer)	in	new	members	across	enlargement	rounds	
during	the	first	ten	years	of	membership	
	
Net	support	for	EU	membership	is	measured	by	the	percentage	of	respondents	in	Eurobarometer	surveys	who	
consider	membership	in	the	EU	‘a	good	thing’	minus	the	percentage	of	those	who	consider	it	‘a	bad	thing’.	
Unfortunately,	Eurobarometer	dropped	the	question	in	2011,	so	we	are	missing	values	for	Eastern	Enlargement	
since	year	9	(2012)	and	for	Romania	and	Bulgaria	since	year	6.	
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Figure	5:		Average	Reasoned	Opinions	per	enlargement	group	compared	to	old	member	states	(median)	
during	the	first	11	years	of	membership	
	
	
	
Figure	6:	Average	annual	number	of	Reasoned	Opinions	by	Member	State	(2008-2015)	
	
We	chose	the	period	of	2008-2015	since	it	covers	all	EU	member	states	(expect	for	Croatia	that	joined	in	July	
2013).	The	data	start	in	2008	rather	than	2007	(the	accession	year	of	Romania	and	Bulgaria),	since	the	lead-
time	to	process	infringement	cases	could	have	biased	the	data	in	their	favour)	
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Figure	7:	Compliance	(Reasoned	Opinions)	of	new	member	states	relative	to	the	old	member	states		
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